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The Value of Foreign Ownership1
John Romalis2

Abstract: We use ﬁrm level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions and share
prices to explore the extent to which foreign ownership increases the proﬁtability of ﬁrms
in emerging markets. We ﬁnd that cross-border acquisitions add value to target ﬁrms.
However, there is only weak evidence that such acquisitions add more value than purely
domestic acquisitions. Further, most of this latter eﬀect occurs when the target ﬁrm’s country is in a crisis.
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1.	Introduction
A growing literature studies the eﬀect of foreign direct investment on ﬁrms in emerging
markets. We take up the question of whether foreign investment in emerging markets
is special because it transfers better technology, managerial skills, or other valuable attributes as compared to what is locally available. We employ event-study methodology
on international databases of mergers and acquisitions and share prices to investigate
whether foreign direct investment (FDI) into emerging markets raises the proﬁtability of
acquired ﬁrms in these markets. Secondly, we examine if acquisitions by ﬁrms from more
developed economies adds more value to the target ﬁrm as compared to acquisitions by
other local ﬁrms in the emerging market. We ﬁnd that foreign acquisitions do indeed increase the proﬁtability of the acquired ﬁrm. There is some evidence that such acquisitions
add more value than purely domestic acquisitions, although most of this eﬀect comes
when the target ﬁrm’s country is in a crisis period. It is only during a crisis that the eﬀect
on the stock market value of the target ﬁrm is positively related to the acquirer country’s
level of income and institutional quality. This eﬀect is negligible outside of crisis times.
Most empirical literature has sought to address the issue of the value of foreign ownership by estimating the productivity eﬀects of FDI.3 This approach, while valuable, has
I especially wish to thank Mark Aguiar and Gita Gopinath for extensive help with this project. I thank
Elena-Claudia Moise for excellent research assistance, and Toby Moskowitz, Per Stromberg, participants at
the Chicago Booth macro workshop and the NBER CRF Summer Institute 2003 for useful comments.

1

2

University of Chicago and NBER

See, Aitken et. al. (1997), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Caves (1996), Haddad and Harrison (1993), Sinha
(1993) and Tybout (1999).

3

108

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 13 | No. 1-2 | 2011

some limitations. Firstly, Katayama et. al. (2003) point out that data on physical quantities of inputs and outputs are usually unavailable, so researchers use proxies that generate
productivity estimates that may bear little relationship to technical eﬃciency. Moreover,
FDI may transfer something useful beyond mere technical eﬃciency, such as logistical or
marketing technology, better access to foreign markets or better access to capital, all of
which can raise the proﬁtability of ﬁrms. In both these regards analyzing share price responses is a useful alternative approach to examining this question. Share prices provide
a convenient market-based summary of whether an acquisition is expected to add some
value to the target ﬁrm, helping to sidestep diﬃcult issues in estimating productivity
from available plant-level data. They incorporate the eﬀect of various channels through
which FDI transfers value to domestic ﬁrms without restricting attention to productivity
transfers alone. Secondly, share prices are a forward looking measure and therefore summarize the present discounted value of net future beneﬁts of foreign ownership. Further,
the high frequency (daily) data allows us to precisely ascertain if the acquisition is the
event driving the change in valuation.
To explore the eﬀect on share prices we construct a database linking acquired ﬁrms to
their share prices. For information on mergers and acquisition we use Thompson Financial Securities Data Company’s (SDC) mergers and acquisition database, which contains
dates and details of cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions. For share price
information we use Datastream. Merging the two databases we obtain a total of 608
unique matches involving target ﬁrms in 19 countries, with daily share price data during
the period 1986-2002. This sample is reduced to 409 unique matches when we restrict the
sample to ﬁrms for which we have information on the size of the ﬁrm, the book to market
value of the ﬁrm, and country-level measures of development and institutional quality.
94 of these ﬁrms were targeted by foreign ﬁrms and the remainder by domestic ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that foreign acquisitions increase the value of the target ﬁrm in
emerging markets. The cumulative abnormal return over an event window that starts
15 days prior to and ends 3 after the date of the announcement is 9.2 %. The acquisition
premium also holds its value 30 days following the acquisition (Figure 1). The premium
is notably larger for smaller targets as measured by market equity. There is some evidence
that the premium is greater than for a purely domestic acquisition. The diﬀerence in the
premium is found to be 3.2% in favor of foreign acquisitions, but this is only marginally
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We then examine the value of a foreign acquisition when the emerging market is going
through a crisis-either a balance of payments crisis or a banking crisis. In most cases the
economy experiences both types of crisis at the same time, a phenomenon referred to as
‘twin crisis’ and detailed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002). During a crisis, the cumulative abnormal return is higher for a ﬁrm that is acquired by a higher income country. We
then test this speciﬁcation by using diﬀerent measures of relative institutional quality
reported in La Porta et al (1998), between the target and acquirer. For some measures of
institutional quality we ﬁnd that crisis period acquisitions are marked by a higher premium for targets acquired by countries with better institutions.
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The event study methodology has been extensively used to analyze the eﬀect of mergers and acquisitions on the valuation of the acquiring and target ﬁrm in the domestic
corporate ﬁnance literature. For an excellent survey of this literature refer to the article
by Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001). The eﬀect of foreign expansions on the stock
market valuation of the acquiring U.S. multinational ﬁrm has also been explored in the
literature. Fatemi (1984) ﬁnds small positive cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring ﬁrm around the date of expansion. Doukas and Travlos (1988) use an event study
methodology to examine the eﬀect on U.S. based acquiring ﬁrms of foreign acquisitions.
They ﬁnd a diﬀerential impact on the acquiring ﬁrm depending on the acquirers prior
experience with foreign expansion.
Morck and Yeung (1992) ﬁnd that acquiring ﬁrms with information based assets experience asigniﬁcantly positive stock price reaction. These studies however do not examine
the eﬀect on the target ﬁrm of a foreign acquisition. To this extent they cannot examine the beneﬁts to economies of foreign acquisitions, the crucial question for emerging
economies, which is what we explore here.
There have been a number of papers that have not used event study methodology to address the question of the value of foreign ownership. The evidence on spillovers to the
acquired ﬁrms is mixed. Early studies surveyed in Caves (1996) suggests that foreignowned ﬁrms in relatively advanced developing countries enjoy little productivity advantage over domestic ﬁrms. More recent literature suggests that Foreign Direct Investment
does bring relatively eﬃcient technologies to developing countries, but that diﬀusion to
domestic ﬁrms is uncertain (Tybout, 1999). In a cross-sectional study of 164 large Indian
manufacturing companies, Sinha (1993) ﬁnds that foreign equity participation is associated with higher productivity. Haddad and Harrison (1993) using a panel of 3,933 Moroccan manufacturing ﬁrms ﬁnd that although foreign-owned ﬁrms had higher productivity levels, they did not have faster rates of productivity growth.4 Aitken and Harrison
(1999) use a panel of over 4,000 Venezuelan ﬁrms to ﬁnd that individual plants beneﬁt
from foreign investment, at least when those plants are small, but that there is a negative
4
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spillover since the productivity of domestically owned plants decreases. Most of these
studies have been country speciﬁc. Since we rely on stock price data, we are able to group
several diﬀerent countries in our analysis. However, we can only analyze acquisitions of
listed companies and it is not possible to analyze “greenﬁeld” investments. While most
FDI into developing countries has historically been through greenﬁeld investments, Figure 2 shows that the proportion that has involved acquisitions of existing companies has
increased sharply in recent years.

2.	Data
Our dataset for mergers and acquisitions is Thompson Financial Securities Data Company’s
(SDC) mergers and acquisition database, which contains dates and details of cross-border
and domestic mergers and acquisitions. Primary source material includes news sources,
SEC ﬁlings and their international counterparts, trade publications, wires and proprietary
surveys of investment banks, law ﬁrms and other advisors. The database includes all corporate transactions involving at least 5% of the ownership of a company where the transaction was valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, deals of any value are covered) or where
the value of the transaction was undisclosed. Public and private transactions are covered.
SDC also reports numerous details about the target and acquiring ﬁrm, including income
and balance sheet items, industry, and ownership. For each ﬁrm acquired, SDC reports the
announcement date of the acquisition and ﬁve years of historical data.
We begin our sample in 1986 (the ﬁrst year for which data is available) and include all mergers and acquisitions through the end of 2002. Forty-ﬁve percent of deals involve a private
target, with public ﬁrms and subsidiaries accounting for a quarter each. The remainder
consists of government ﬁrms (1%) and joint-ventures (4%). The regressions below require
share price data that are unavailable for privately held ﬁrms. Therefore, the regression samples only include publicly traded ﬁrms. The mean purchase involves 25% of the ﬁrm.
The SDC database provides information on the acquiring and merged ﬁrm only prior
to the date of acquisition. Since we are interested in the market valuation of the ﬁrm
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in an interval around the date of the announcement we merge the SDC database with
data reports of the ﬁrm in Datastream. This is a non-trivial merge, since ﬁrm names
are not reported identically in both databases and there is no common identiﬁer for a
ﬁrm. We searched for matches based on common name, country, currency, share price
4 weeks prior to announcement and total number of shares outstanding 4 weeks prior
to announcement. We obtained a total of 608 unique matches involving target ﬁrms in
19 countries. This sample is reduced to 409 unique matches when we restrict the sample
to ﬁrms for which we have information on the size, book to market value, PPP adjusted
GDP and crisis information. 94 of these ﬁrms were targeted by foreign ﬁrms and the remainder by domestic ﬁrms. In the crisis sample we have 69 observations, 22 of which are
acquisitions by foreign ﬁrms and the remainder 47 by domestic ﬁrms.
Our categorization of a country as an emerging market follows the deﬁnition used by
Standard & Poor in constructing their Emerging Market Bonds index. The classiﬁcation
of emerging markets into low income and high income emerging markets follows the
World Bank deﬁnition based on PPP adjusted GDP per capita. See Table 1 and Table 2
for the list of target and acquiring countries respectively. Table 1 also lists the years that
are deﬁned as crisis years for each country. We use the dates listed in Kaminsky and Re-
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inhart (2002) and Kaminsky (2003). We deﬁne the crisis dummy to take a value of 1 in a
particular year if the country experiences a balance of payments or a banking crisis or is
a year immediately following either type of crisis. For instance, the crisis dummy takes
a value of 1 for South Korea in the year 1997 and 1998, where 1997 is the year the crisis
originated in South Korea.
Table 3 lists the number of acquisitions in our ﬁnal sample by year. The ﬁrst acquisition
in our sample was announced in 1991, but most of the acquisitions take place post 1994.
Table 4 lists some characteristic of target ﬁrms grouped by type of acquirer and between
crisis and non-crisis periods.

3.	Empirical Analysis
Our event-study methodology is derived from Campbell et. al. (1997). Our event at eventtime T is when a ﬁrm from any country makes an announcement that it is to acquire,
or increase its holdings by, at least 5 percent of a ﬁrm domiciled in one of a selection of
emerging markets. If there is more than one announcement for the same target ﬁrm,
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we study the ﬁrst of these announcements. In the ﬁrst stage, we assume that the normal
return of a ﬁrms stock is a linear function of the market return:
(1)
where the market return Rct is the Datastream Total Market Index for country c and Rict is
the actual return. We estimate (1) using daily data that includes one year of observations
that ends 30 days prior to the announcement date.
In the second stage, we estimate the abnormal returns for each selected target ﬁrm and
examine these abnormal returns for an event window that starts 15 days prior to and
ends 3 days after the announcement. The abnormal return ωict at event-time t for ﬁrm i
in country c is deﬁned by Equation (2).
(2)
where E[Rict] is the normal return. We then calculate the cumulative abnormal return for
each stock i in country c at time t over the 19 day event window.
(3)
where t is the announcement date. The reason we start the event window 15 days prior
to the announcement is because we expect that there will be some leakage of information regarding the acquisition prior to the actual announcement that will cause the share
price to respond.
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In the third stage, we analyze the relation between the cumulated excess returns and the
characteristics of the acquiring and target ﬁrm during and outside of crisis years.

where X1,c includes variables that measure the relative development of the acquirer’s country to the target country. This includes diﬀerences in income, institutions and ﬁnancial
development. This is indexed by country only as this measure doesn’t change over time.
Ct is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the announcement date coincides with a
crisis period. X2,ict includes measures that control for target ﬁrm characteristics. Dc and
DY are country and year of announcement ﬁxed eﬀects.
The results of this inquiry are reported in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. In Table 5, column
(1) we report that acquisitions from any source increase the value of the target by 6.7%
and this estimate is highly signiﬁcant. The results in column (2) distinguish between acquisitions by foreign ﬁrms and those by domestic acquirers. A foreign acquisition raises
the value of the target by 9.2%, while a domestic acquisition raises value by 6.0%. This
provides some modest evidence that foreign acquirers add more value than domestic
acquirers.
Since foreignness does not guarantee acquisition by a more developed nation, in column
(3)we report the eﬀect of acquisitions by high income foreign acquirers. This follows
the World Bank’s deﬁnition of a High Income country.5 The acquisition premium for
a high-income foreign acquirer is 8.2%, insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from the 6.5 % average
for other acquisitions. In column (4) we ﬁnd that relative income diﬀerences between the
acquirer and target country have an eﬀect on the acquisition premium for the target in
our sample -the greater is the relative income in the acquirer country the higher is the
acquisition premium. The reconciliation of the results in columns (3) and (4) is that acquisitions from high-income emerging markets to low-income emerging markets carry
a substantial premium. In columns (5) and (6) we repeat the regressions in (3) and (4)
while controlling for country and year ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁrm size and book to market value.
We again ﬁnd some evidence that acquisitions from higher-income countries increases
premiums.
Since we ﬁnd mixed evidence on the value to a developing country ﬁrm of being acquired by a developed country ﬁrm, our results are similar to the evidence from nonevent-study approaches to measuring the value of FDI (see Aitken and Harrison (1999)).
To the extent that data limitations prevent us from controlling for all diﬀerences in ﬁrm
characteristics between targets acquired by domestic ﬁrms and those by foreign ﬁrms,
our approach has some limitations. However, it is interesting to note that there isn’t overwhelming evidence that developed country acquirers add substantially more value.

Since South Korea is an emerging market, despite being deﬁned as a high income country we exclude it from
the group of developed countries.

5
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We next examine how the diﬀerential eﬀect varies between crisis and non-crisis years.
This is reported in Table 6. Across diﬀerent speciﬁcations we ﬁnd that relative income
has an eﬀect on the premium for the target during a crisis period but not in non-crisis
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periods. The market more greatly values acquisitions by ﬁrms from relatively higher income countries during a crisis, while this eﬀect is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in
non-crisis periods. In Table 7 we continue this analysis using indicators that capture
diﬀerent levels of quality of domestic institutions such as expropriation risk, bribery,
judicial eﬀectiveness, and ﬁnancial development proxied by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. We use these measures one at a time because they turn out to be highly
correlated. We ﬁnd some evidence that being acquired by a country with better institutions has a positive eﬀect on the premium for the target relative to a purely domestic
acquisition, but again only in crisis periods.
One possible inference of the results in Tables 6 and 7 is that one of the main ingredients
that more developed country ﬁrms can transfer to local ﬁrms is liquidity. Outside of
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crisis periods this liquidity eﬀect is less important as compared to a crisis period when
emerging market countries ﬁnd themselves in ﬁnancial distress. This is consistent with
Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) who ﬁnd evidence of liquidity driven sales during the crisis
in East Asia.
Table 8 examines the eﬀect on the acquirer ﬁrms located in the United States following acquisition announcements in emerging markets. The average cumulative abnormal
return for the acquiring ﬁrm is 1.6%. The acquirers gain most when they acquire more
than 50% of the shares outstanding of the target ﬁrm. There is little signiﬁcant evidence
that the acquirer premium is systematically related to market equity, book to market
equity of the target ﬁrm or the crisis dummy.

4.	Conclusion
In this paper we adopt an event-study approach using share price data to estimate the
value of foreign ownership. Share prices are a convenient forward-looking market based
summary of whether an acquisition is expected to add value. The high frequency of this
data also allows us to ascertain if the acquisition is the event driving the change in valuation. Using this approach, we ﬁnd that cross-border acquisitions add signiﬁcant value to
target ﬁrms. There is weaker evidence that such acquisitions on average add more value
than purely domestic acquisitions in emerging markets. In crisis years there is evidence
of a higher premium for target ﬁrms acquired by a ﬁrm headquartered in a more developed economy.
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